Atomic Bomb Essay: World War 2


As a global content agency, we present you an example of Atomic Bomb Essay, written by our expert writers. Look at the below paragraphs to deepen your knowledge and analyze the sample essay, titled as “Atomic Bombs of World War 2.”

Atomic Bomb Essay: World War 2

Atomic Bomb Essay: Introduction

This paper addresses the atomic bombs of the 2nd World War. It deals with subjects such as project history, primary objectives, bomb disputes, Soviet negotiations, the Trinity Test, initial attacks, times for surrender and radiation poisoning. The article indicates that while many lives were lost in Japan, the atomic bombing decision was a successful one in the long term, as it ended the Second World War and still prevents wars from happening.

Body Paragraphs

Months before the test was detonated, key War Department officials were concerned, among others, about the political and security challenges and possibilities posed by the project; the potential for immensely powerful hydrogen bombs, immense strategic capacity, hidden boundaries, the possibility of a global arms race and the need for international intelligence sharing and world influence. This memorandum is from Bush's obsession with the "cavalier" idea that President Roosevelt might retain a British-American atomic hegemony after World war II. Martin Sherwin and James Hershberg see this memorandum. They also prepared a report to warn senior officials of the prospect of a monopoly.[1]

The reserves with B-29 nuclear power supplies fit for deployment for the first time in the Western Pacific, providing an operational base in the army air reserves' 509th Composite Group. The High Command chose the Tinian Island in the Northern Marianas Islands in late February 1945, months before nuclear bombs were available for use. Harry Truman learned of the top-secret Manhattan Project soon after he became worthy as President following Roosevelt's assassination. Truman never had an idea of the entire scale of the operation when he obtained a briefing from War Secretary Stimson and Manhattan Project Director-General Groves. In his diary, Stimson also produced a paper that brought up broader political issues related to "the terrible weapon ever known to human history" and later wrote that meeting in his journal.[2]

In an overview of the nuclear bomb project from raw materials, to the treatment of nuclear fuel to the assembly of arms to the planned use, which had already crystallized, Groves provided a background report. On the first point, an implosion weapon will be available that month and the first weapon "would be ready by August 1 1945." "The target is and always was to be Japan." It was a contentious question whether Truman's Roosevelt administration "inherited expectations" that the bomb was to be used. Alperovitz and Sherwin concluded that Truman had made a clear decision to use the Japan bombing to chose between various political and warlike types. Barton Bernstein, in contrast, finds that Truman would never challenge the assumption of the bomb. Robert S. Norris has noted that Truman decided to refrain from ignoring past bombing plans.[3]

Military officials and atomic scientists met at the end of April to discuss bombing, target selection and the requirements of the mission. Hiroshima, the most massive untouched target not the 21st priority list of Bomber Command, was part of the discussion of the available targets. Oppenheimer explained to General Farrell the need for precautionary measures in his discussions of the radiological dangers of a nuclear detonation. More clarification was provided by the scientists and officials on the specifications of the bombing missions, including detonation height, the weather, the preparations to carry out a potential mission abort, and specific aspects of target selection.

Stimson had some talks on 14 and 15 May with S-1(atomic bomb) in which, in a speech with War Delegate Secretary John J. McCloy, he said that ownership of the weapon presented Washington with a tremendous benefit in negotiating with Moscow in the wake of the war, that it had a real bright flush. The next day, Stimson asked minutes depending on if the atomic bomb would be planned in July while Truman visited Stalin. Their differences about the Far East made him wonder. If so, he figured the bomb would be the U.S. diplomacy master card. It and other Stimson diary entries, as even the subsequent Davies diary entry, too, are relevant to the claims by, though with somewhat different emphases, Gar Alperovitz as Barton J. Bernstein who claimed that the highest officials in the Truman administration had a conflict with the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and other places.[4]

Physicists Leo Szilard and Nobel prize recipient James Franck were researching the Manhattan Bomb Fuel Experiment, the employees of the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory. Outspread Szilard did not take part in explosive tactical research, and General Groves kept him under observation, but the head of Met Lab considered Szilard useful. Concerning the long-term effects of the blast, Franck chaired a committee that included significant contributions from Szilard and Eugene Rabinowitch, that produced a report which dismissed a surprise attack on Japan and then suggested that a desert or stony island blast be demonstrated.

The committee regarded the remote monitoring as the solution to claim that the nuclear weapons race should take place early in the aftermath of the first example of the presence of nuclear weaponry. If the United States had first used the arms offensive, that would be impossible. Arthur Compton, director of Met Lab, addressed concerns about the decision but demanded the study from Stimson. Martin Sherwin argued that the Franck Committee agreed with Truman that a nuclear strike on Japan would shock Russians, but drawn opposite conclusions as to how this shock would be imported.[5]

The U.S. military intelligence has been regularly decrypting the cable traffic intercepted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry under the cover name Magic since September 1940. The National Security Agency retained long-standing classification of Magic diplomatic and military summaries and only published the 1942 collection by August 1945 during the early 1990s. This summary includes a cable report to Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow from the Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo on the emperor's decision to seek Soviet help to bring the war to a close. Without realizing that the Soviets have already pledged themselves to their allies to wage war on Japan, for several weeks, Tokyo has pursued this option.[6]

A happy message of the "Trinity" test of a plutonium implosion arms from Harrison to Stimson was published. "From here [Weshington, D.C], to high hold," the glow from the blast could be seen ", and it was so noisy that Harrison could hear the" screams "from Washington, D.C. The Stimson estate was 250 miles away from here." It was too noisy. On August 16, the first nuclear test was performed in the desert of New Mexico. General Groves also written a comprehensive account of the "Trinity" study for Stimson and then for Potsdam.[7]

The day after the bombing of Hiroshima, Groves briefed on the effects of the detonation, which killed at least 70,000 civilians instantly, many later died of radiation poisoning and other causes, and sent letters to the Chief of Staff Marshall. The influence of the Hiroshima and subsequent Nagasaki nuclear bombings on the Japanese decision to surrender was controversial among historians, compared to the effects of the Soviet declaration of war.[8]

Excerpts from the compilation of the Foreign Minister about the end of the war show how the attack reached Tokyo and how Togo's Foreign Minister first reacted to Hiroshima reports. When Togo learned of the nuclear bombing at the Domei News Agency, it was time to give up the Atomic Bombs and inform the cabinet that the atomic attack allowed Japan to give up by the Potsdam declaration. However, Togo couldn't convince the cabinet, and the Army would have wanted to delay decisions until it heard about Hiroshima.

Hirohito agreed with it when the Federal Foreign Minister visited the emperor; he announced that the highest priority was an early end to the war, although it would be appropriate if the U.S. supported a figurehead emperor if it hadn't intervened with this aim. Despite these orders, the Supreme War Council was to be convened the next day, according to Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki.

Further information about the attitude of influential Japanese circles after Hiroshima and before the Soviet declaration of war and the bombing of Nagasaki can be learned from the Admiral Tagaki's August 8 diary. The Tagaki was concerned about further deterioration when he saw the bombing in Hiroshima as a sign that the situation at home would worsen. However, his diary says that the military hardliners are in charge, and Prime Minister Suzuki spoke hard against giving up, recalling last minutes in the history of Japan and warning about the risk of subordinate commanders being unable to comply.

The last remark made Navy Minister Yonai worse, who found it insensitive. It was known that the Soviets had not replied to the demand of Sato for a meeting; Yonai knew that the government had to brace the likelihood that Moscow could not support. Iwao Yamazaki, the Interior Ministry in the subsequent government, was one of the guests listed at the start of the entry.[9]

The Japanese cabinet (who made unanimous decisions) could not reach consensus on acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration despite the bombardment of Hiroshima, the Soviet declaration of war and increased concern over domestic instability. Members of the Big Six Supreme War Council wanted at least four conditions for the Potsdam reply (e.g., no occupation, voluntary disarmament); they were prepared to fight to the end. But the peace party manoeuvred hard, convincing a reluctant emperor to intervene, to break the deadlock. Hasegawa says that Hirohito was convinced of the importance of preserving the monarchy.[10]

While Japan reports on dangerous diseases among the Hiroshima and Nagasaki casualties were released, General Groves and Dr Charles Rea were unable to consider the facts and denied the reporting as propaganda. The wounds were heat burns to them. A month after the attack, General Farrell deputy Groves flew to Japan to see Hiroshima and Nagasaki being devastated. His colourful comments show that top military leaders with the Manhattan Project have not dismissed radiation poisoning warnings any longer. The review of previously submitted Japanese studies is generally accurate with relation to health consequences of a single gamma radiation dose.[11]

Atomic Bomb Essay: Conclusion

In conclusion, this article examined the atomic bombs that ended World War 2. It covered topics such as project background, specific targets, discussions on bombs, Soviet mediation, the Trinity Test, initial attack, surrender period, and radiation poisoning. It is evident in the article that although many lives were lost in Japan, atomic bomb decision turned out to be a right decision in the long term since it ended the World War 2 and still prevents wars from happening.


[1] Hershberg, James G. James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the making of the nuclear age. Stanford University Press, 1995.

[2] Hershberg, 1995, 2003-207.

[3] Bernstein, Barton J. "Understanding the atomic bomb and the Japanese surrender: missed opportunities, little‐known near-disasters, and modern memory." Diplomatic History 19, no. 2 (1995)

[4] Bernstein, Barton J. "The atomic bombings reconsidered." Foreign Aff. 74 (1995)

[5] Szilard, L. "Toward a livable world: Leo Szilard and the crusade for nuclear arms control. Vol. 3." (1987)

[6] Maddox, Robert James, ed. Hiroshima in history: the myths of revisionism. University of Missouri Press, 2007.

[7] Reed, Bruce Cameron. "Bibliography and links." In Atomic Bomb: The Story of the Manhattan Project. Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2015.

[8] Asada, Sadao. "The shock of the atomic bomb and Japan's decision to surrender: a reconsideration." The Pacific Historical Review 67, no. 4 (1998)

[9] Asada, 1998, 486-488.

[10] Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan. Harvard University Press, 2009.

[11] Bernstein, Barton J. "Reconsidering the" atomic general": Leslie R. Groves." The Journal of Military History 67, no. 3 (2003)

Thank you for reading. If you need further information, feel free to have a look at our essay samples or contact us at live chat.

Baris Yalcin
Baris Yalcin
Content Editor at Tamara Research. Movie and music addict. Bachelor's degree in Translation and Interpreting.

Recently on Tamara Blog

Tamara Team

Annotated Bibliography on Public Health

In today’s world of pandemic, most people have finally understood the significance of public health. In this direction, one should highlight the drawbacks for minor populations and risk groups. Accordingly, in this assignment, six articles related to hand-hygiene standards, locus of control and marginalized populations, children with type 1 diabetes and ASD, pregnant adolescent woman, elder neglect in US, and the impact of financial crisis on healthcare have been annotated.

Read More »